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02-02 22:38 - 'The 2016 US presidential election is about as odd and unheard of as they come, but... / The Halifax explosion of 1917 is pretty good. / The Kilmainham executions in Ireland after the Easter rising. / My favorite would be the bio...' by /u/schad501 removed from /r/history within 0-5min

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The 2016 US presidential election is about as odd and unheard of as they come, but...
The Halifax explosion of 1917 is pretty good.
The Kilmainham executions in Ireland after the Easter rising.
My favorite would be the biography of Tisquantum (aka Squanto), which would make a fantastic movie. I leave you to discover the details on your own. You won't be disappointed.
'''
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Author: schad501
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How does American democracy compare with democracy in the rest of the world? Part 2: divided-power.

Welcome to part two of my two-part series comparing American democracy with the rest of the world, based on the modern classic of comparative politics Patterns of Democracy (2nd edition) by Arend Lijphart (rhymes with pipe-heart), published in 2012. Yes, part one is very long (and very fascinating, I’m told), but you don’t need to read it unless you want to, because I’ll briefly summarize the parts you need to understand.
In his book, Lijphart classifies democracies into two broad categories, based on the question: who should the government be responsive to when the people are in disagreement? The answer provided by the majoritarian model of democracy is that government should be responsive to a majority of the people, or often in practice, a plurality of the people. In contrast, the consensus model of democracy accepts support from the majority as only a minimum requirement, and instead seeks to foster broad participation in government and broad agreement on policies.
There are two complementary approaches to building a consensus democracy (or building a majoritarian democracy, if the antithesis of each approach is used). The first, the joint-power approach, seeks to broadly share power within institutions, for example multiparty systems, proportional representation, and coalition cabinets. In contrast, the divided-power approach diffuses power across separate institutions, for example across central and regional governments (federalism), upper and lower houses of the legislature (bicameralism), independent central banks, and constitutional courts with the power of judicial review.
Note that these two approaches are complementary, not mutually exclusive. A democracy can embrace both joint-power and divided-power approaches, reject both, or embrace one while rejecting the other. As such, every democracy can be roughly divided into one of 4 quadrants. Here is a table displaying a prototypical democracy from each quadrant.
  joint-power non-joint-power
non-divided-power Israel UK
divided-power Switzerland USA
The United States’ approach to democracy almost uniformly rejects joint-power, while embracing divided-power, so we sit somewhere between a majoritarian democracy like the UK and a consensus democracy like Switzerland. In the last post I discussed non-joint-power in the United States, and in this post I’ll be covering divided-power.
At the end, I’ll finish up with Lijphart’s conclusions on the effectiveness of consensus democracy vs. majoritarian democracy in general (spoiler: consensus democracy is better), and I’ll give my thoughts on the future of democratic institutional reform in the United States.

Divided-power in the United States

Let’s take another look at Lijphart’s conceptual map of democracy (democracies further to the left embrace the joint-power approach, while those toward the bottom embrace divided-power). As you can see from the conceptual map, out of the 36 sufficiently large and long-lived democracies in Lijphart’s sample, the United States ranks as a very close second to Germany in its strong approach to divided-power. Other notable divided-power democracies include Australia, Argentina, Canada, and Switzerland, with Switzerland being the joint-power black sheep of the group (Germany is also joint-power, but not to the same extent).
Lijphart describes five institutions that can be used to build a divided-power democracy, and the United States has fine examples of all of them.
  1. A federal government instead of a unitary government
  2. A bicameral legislature instead of a unicameral legislature.
  3. A rigid constitution that can only be changed by an extraordinary majority, as opposed to a flexible constitution that can be changed by a simple majority.
  4. A Supreme Court with the power to review legislation, rather than the legislature having the final say on the constitutionality of its own legislation.
  5. A central bank that is independent from the executive, as opposed to a central bank that is controlled by the executive.
Let’s talk about each of these aspects of divided-power, and how they are implemented in the United States in comparison to the rest of the world.

An exceptionally strong federalism

At its most basic, federalism means that there is a guaranteed division of power between central and regional governments. But how do we guarantee that such a division of power remains stable? There are typically three institutions that serve that purpose. Notice that these are the same as 2, 3, and 4 in the list of divided-power institutions above.
  1. A bicameral legislature with a strong second chamber dedicated to representing the regions of the federation.
  2. A written constitution outlining the federal division of power. To keep the division of power stable this constitution needs to be rigid, meaning that it should be difficult to amend.
  3. A supreme or constitutional court that can protect the constitution with the power of judicial review, meaning that the court has the final say on the constitutionality of executive and legislative actions.
What is federalism good for though? Federalism is particularly well suited to very large countries (in terms of both population and geographic size), and to very diverse countries (in terms of religions, ethnic groups, languages spoken, etc.).
The United States is the second most populous democracy in the world, with the first being India, which is also federal. The least populous federation is Switzerland, though it is still relatively large, being approximately in the middle of Lijphart’s 36 countries ranked by population.
In terms of diversity, the US is only semi-diverse according to Lijphart’s classification, and in any case, state lines are not and probably could not be drawn with regard to separate racial, ethnic, and religious groups, as they can be in some other countries.
In the case of India, a highly diverse society, British colonial authorities drew administrative lines without regard for linguistic differences, an unfortunate situation which was not corrected until the 1950’s, providing additional representation for linguistic minorities. Canada and Switzerland are other examples of federations with regional lines drawn (at least roughly) to contain cultural and linguistic minorities.
It’s not common, but for diverse societies it’s also possible to have federal territories that are not defined geographically, for example Belgium’s three cultural communities.
There is another possible purpose of federalism, and that is to allow the regions to experiment with different forms of government. In practice, however, regional governments tend to be extremely similar to the central government. If you’ve ever wondered why almost every US state has a bicameral legislature, even though state governments are not federal and some states are extremely small, then there’s your answer: there is no good reason, except that it mirrors the form of the central government. Presidentialism, too, has leaked into the states, with governors essentially acting as presidents for each state, despite the flaws of presidentialism I went over in the first post.
There has been some experimentation with electoral systems among the states, for example ranked choice voting for congressional and presidential elections in Alaska and Maine and for local elections in many other states. There has only been one notable exception when it comes to majority/plurality electoral systems, in the state of Illinois, which used cumulative voting (a semi-proportional method) for its lower house from 1870 to 1980.
Another notable case outside of the USA is Australia, with the state of Tasmania and the Australian Capital Territory using the single-transferable-vote form of proportional representation for electing their regional assemblies, unlike the Australian House of Representatives and the regional lower houses of every other Australian state which all use ranked choice voting, a majority/plurality voting method. However, single-transferable-vote is far from unheard of in Australia, as it is also used to elect the national Senate.
Of course, in the United States there has been a great degree of experimentation with state laws, including of taxation, drug prohibition, environmental regulations, etc. This has allowed some states to learn from the experiments of others, and at times has allowed certain states to lag far behind the others, depending on your perspective.

Bicameralism taken too far?

Bicameralism, meaning the division of the legislature into two differently constituted chambers, is closely associated with federalism, as the purpose of the second chamber is typically to give additional representation to the regions of the federation. In Lijphart’s sample, all 9 of the federal countries are bicameral, while only about half of the 27 remaining non-federal countries are bicameral. The unicameral countries tend to have smaller populations. Worldwide, about ⅔ of countries are unicameral.
Typically, the first chamber tends to be the more important of the two, with the second chamber in a subordinate role, though there are notable exceptions: the United States, Argentina, Italy, Switzerland, and Uruguay all have chambers with approximately equal powers, or arguably in the case of the United States, greater powers. Second chambers that are directly elected tend to be more powerful, as direct election gives the second chamber additional democratic legitimacy and thus greater political influence, which is true for the five countries with powerful second chambers except for Switzerland, where most but not all members of the second chamber are directly elected.
Some less important differences are that the first chamber also tends to be the larger one (with the only exception being the British House of Lords). Terms of office tend to be longer in second chambers, and second chambers tend to have staggered elections.
One of the most important differences is that second chambers are often designed to overrepresent certain minorities, the most common example being the overrepresentation of regions with smaller populations, as seen in federalism. In this table you can see the degree to which different countries overrepresent the smaller regions.
The three countries with the greatest degree of overrepresentation of smaller regions are Argentina, the United States, and Switzerland. These are also countries where all regions have equal representation in the second chamber regardless of population size. The same is true of Australia, which ranks 5th on the chart. In the United States, a staggering 10% of the best represented voters control 39.7% of the seats in the Senate. Other countries like Germany and Canada give greater, but not equal, representation to smaller regions, while Belgium gives only slight overrepresentation to its French and German-speaking minorities.
In the United States the second chamber has some unique powers, such as ratifying treaties and confirming members of the federal judiciary, that the first chamber does not have. This, combined with the Supreme Court being one of the most powerful activist courts in the world, has produced an unusual situation where a minority controls an arguably more powerful second chamber. And the situation is only getting worse: by 2040, two-thirds of Americans will be represented by only 30% of the Senate.
Having a bicameral legislature with special representation for smaller regions is an important guarantor of federalism, but as we can see from other countries like Canada, Australia, and Germany, the amount of overrepresentation seen in the United States is not necessary to maintain a strong form of federalism. Only time will tell whether the United States can maintain a stable and legitimate government in a state of continually strengthening minority rule.

The most rigid constitution in the world

A rigid federal constitution is another important guarantor of federalism, and the United States has the least flexible constitution in the world, with two-thirds majorities in both the House and Senate as well as the approval of 3/4ths of the states being required to pass a constitutional amendment. There are several other countries where supermajorities are required, as you can see in this table, but not to the same degree as in the United States. It is one of the reasons the United States has the shortest written constitution in the world at 4,400 words, despite being one of the oldest constitutions.
Having a constitution is not itself enough to guarantee federalism, an institution is also needed to defend the constitution. Independent courts with the power of judicial review fulfill that purpose, and the United States has one of the most vigorous federal courts, as you can see in this table. The German Constitutional Court arguably ranks in second place. Judicial review is particularly strong in several other countries besides the USA and Germany: India, and recently, Canada, Costa Rica, and Argentina. When it comes to the United States, Lijphart notes that, “The activist American courts and the Supreme Court in particular have been accused of forming an ‘imperial judiciary.’”
A rigid constitution and the courts with independent review to back it up are an important anti-majoritarian device, while having a flexible constitution and no judicial review allow unrestricted majority rule. The UK is a prime example of majority rule, and is also one of only 3 democracies of Lijphart’s 36 with no written constitution, the other 2 being New Zealand and Israel. Switzerland is an odd outlier, being an otherwise completely consensual democracy with no judicial review, despite having a strong form of federalism. Perhaps this demonstrates that judicial review is helpful, but not essential, to maintaining federalism.

The paradox of the US Supreme Court

As explained in the last section, activist courts with the power of judicial review are an anti-majoritarian device, but the US Supreme Court is majoritarian in its makeup in almost every respect, in contrast to the German Constitutional Court and the Indian Supreme Court which follow a more consensual pattern.
One example of the Supreme Court’s majoritarianism is its small number of justices, only 9, compared with 16 in Germany and 29 in India. This places a hard limit on the amount of broad representation of different population groups on the Supreme Court. A second majoritarian aspect is that justices are chosen by majority in the Senate, unlike the two-thirds majorities required in both German chambers. The court itself makes decisions by majority, which increases the power of the court to make decisions, but decreases the consensual nature of the decision-making.
There are a couple more reasons the Supreme Court is majoritarian in its makeup: one is that vacancies are filled as they occur, allowing majorities to sequentially pick their favorites, whereas if justices were chosen as a group it would be more likely for minorities to be chosen. A second reason is that US justices have very long terms, which tends to be an obstacle to broad representation in an evolving society. In Germany and India, justices have mandatory retirement ages of 68 and 65, respectively, and in Germany they are chosen to 12 year non-renewable terms.
This paradox of a consensual institution with majoritarian rules is seen not only in the Supreme Court, but in many other institutions of American democracy. The presidency, for example, represents a division of power between the executive and legislative, an expression of divided-power, while the presidency itself, a single person elected by majority, is the antithesis of consensus decision making.

One of the most independent central banks… at least until the 90’s.

Central banks are crucial policy-making institutions, particularly when they are strong and independent. Having a strong and independent central bank is an important aspect of the divided-power approach to building a consensus democracy (recall that an independent central bank is one of the five divided-power institutions enumerated above).
The most important duty of central banks is making monetary policy – the regulation of interest rates and the supply of money, which in turn has effects on price stability, inflation, unemployment, economic growth, and the business cycle.
According to the Cukierman Index of Independence, central banks are at their most independent when they have exclusive jurisdiction over monetary policy and their only or primary task is to maintain price stability. Central banks may be less strong when they have multiple, possibly conflicting goals, such as both price stability and full employment. Other important aspects of bank independence are the independence of the bank’s governor from the executive, and when the bank is in full control of the terms of lending to the central government.
Until around 1994, central bank independence was strongly correlated with federalism, another important divided-power institution, and the five central banks with the greatest independence were all federal systems: Germany, Switzerland, the United States, Austria, and Canada. As you can see in this table (continued here), these five banks reigned supreme as the most independent central banks in the world for 50 years, from 1945 to 1994.
After 1994, many European central banks became remarkably more independent as a condition for participating in the euro, per the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, for example the Spanish, French, and Italian central banks which all increased by approximately .5 on the Cukierman Index in 1994, easily surpassing the United States. The establishment of the European Central Bank in 1998 and the adoption of the euro transformed the central bank for those countries into an element of the international system. After that, the correlation between federalism and central bank independence shrank considerably, as the central bank was no longer a domestic institution, following the same divided-power approach as the rest of the domestic government.
The United States, in contrast, has remained completely static from 1945 until the present day, with a Cukierman Index of .56, putting it in 17th place among Lijphart’s 36 major democracies as of 2010. It’s beyond the scope of Lijphart’s book, and my own expertise, to say whether this has had any effect on economic growth or the ability of the Federal Reserve to maintain price stability, compared to EU countries.

Categorizing democracies using joint-power and divided-power

I want to talk about how majoritarian and consensus democracies perform in practice in the next section, but first, I would be amiss if I didn’t mention what Liphart describes as “one of the most important general findings of this book”, which is that the five variables representing divided-power tend to be clustered with one another, and also the five variables representing joint-power tend to be clustered with one another.
For example, democracies which are federalist also tend to have bicameralism, constitutional rigidity, judicial review, and central bank independence (that last one only prior to 1994), all examples of divided-power institutions. Likewise, democracies with a lower percentage of minimal winning one-party cabinets also tend to have more political parties, less executive dominance, more proportional election systems, and greater interest group pluralism, all important divided-power institutions. Take a look at this factor analysis for a more precise picture. The numbers may be thought of as the correlation coefficient between the variable and factor 1 and 2, which represent joint-power and divided-power, respectively.
Meanwhile, between the two approaches, joint-power and divided-power, there is very little correlation, for example federalism is not well correlated with the number of political parties. The United States is a perfect example of mixing the two approaches, as it closely adheres to the divided-power approach, while rejecting joint-power. These correlations are of immense interest to comparative political scientists, because it represents a useful way to categorize democracies along two dimensions.
How is it that democracies end up embracing either of the two approaches? Taking another look at the conceptual map, one of the most striking patterns is that countries on the right side, the non-joint-power side, tend to be former British colonies, with some exceptions such as Argentina, Costa Rica, Greece, Spain, South Korea, and France. As Lijphart notes: “France is an especially interesting exceptional case: in view of French president de Gaulle’s deeply felt and frequently expressed antagonism towards les anglo-saxons, it is ironic that the republic he created is the most Anglo-Saxon of any of the continental European democracies.” The left side of the map, in contrast, includes most of the continental European democracies, and all five of the Nordic countries, which have a common Scandinavian cultural heritage of consensus decision making and arbitration.
There are some exceptions on the left side as well (the joint-power side): Ireland, India, Israel, and Mauritius all were formerly under British colonial rule, the difference is that these are highly plural societies, where majoritarianism and its associated non-joint-power approach just do not work well in practice, often leading to sectarian violence, as I explained in the first post.
What about the divided-power approach, signified by the bottom of the conceptual map? As explained earlier in this post, the size of the country (both in terms of population and geographic size), as well as diversity, are significantly correlated with the divided-power approach. In other words, the countries embracing divided-power tend to be larger and more diverse.

Wrapping up: majoritarian vs. consensus democracy

So how do majoritarian and consensus democracies stack up in practice? The conventional wisdom is that majoritarian democracies are less representative of the population, but are more decisive, and therefore better at governing effectively. Lijphart argues that faster decisions are not always wiser decisions, in fact the opposite is often true, and policies that are supported by broad consensus are more likely to be successfully implemented. He also observes that non-joint-power democracies like the United States have the disadvantage of frequently flip-flopping between contrasting policies whenever government control changes hands from one party to the other.
Lijphart runs a regression on 17 indicators of government performance, such as government effectiveness, rule of law, and control of corruption, and finds that the joint-power approach is favorably correlated to a statistically significant degree with 9 out of 17 of them, while non-joint-power is only correlated with economic growth, but not to a statistically significant degree. In general, all of the correlations with economic variables are weak, such as with unemployment, budget balance, and economic freedom. Divided-power, meanwhile, has such weak correlations with all of the government performance variables that no firm conclusions can be drawn.
Lijphart concludes that while joint-power democracies are not necessarily proven better than majoritarian democracies at all aspects of governing, they are almost certainly not worse, as the conventional wisdom goes, and along many aspects they are significantly better.
One major exception is that when it comes to the control of violence, joint-power is very strongly correlated with a lower degree of violence, an intuitive result considering the discussion in my first post of the incompatibility between majoritarianism and diverse societies, as exemplified by Northern Ireland.

Consensus democracy: the “kinder, gentler” democracy

Consensus democracies may not always be superior decision makers, but Lijphart is able to draw other conclusions on the tendencies of joint-power democracies, but not so much on divided-power. He finds that joint-power democracies are more likely to be welfare states, have a better record of protecting the environment, put fewer people in prison and are less likely to have the death penalty, and are more generous with economic assistance to developing nations.
When it comes to putting people in prison, the United States is such an extreme outlier among other democracies that Lijphart found it necessary to remove it from the analysis, but still, the effect of joint-power on incarceration rates was strongly negative and statistically significant. The USA has 743 prisoners per hundred thousand people, twice as many as the next democracy in Lijphart’s analysis, the Bahamas. Even extending the analysis to non-democracies, the USA has the highest incarceration rate in the world, with either Russia or China in second place, depending on the survey.
When it comes to government effectiveness and “kinder, gentler” policies in general, the problem with all of these correlations, as Lijphart points out, is that culture may be a confounding variable, and “consensus democracy may not be able to take root and thrive unless it is supported by a consensual political culture.” But he offers hope that the cause-and-effect may go both ways: consensual democratic institutions may have the effect of making an adversarial political culture more consensual. Switzerland and Austria have not always had a consensual culture, their histories being marked by violent strife, while today Belgium, India, and Israel have adversarial cultures and consensual institutions. One hopes that over time those country’s institutions will have a positive effect on their contentious political cultures.

Where does the United States go from here?

The bad news is that the United States is probably not going to change one bit along the joint-power and divided-power dimensions. Some few countries have made a move towards federalism over time, and even more rarely a handful of countries such as New Zealand have moved towards proportional representation and a joint-power approach, but in general all democracies have been extremely stable along the joint-power and divided-power dimensions from 1945 to 2010, especially the United States, with its exceptionally rigid constitution. The bottom line: if you’re an American looking for a relatively “kinder, gentler” democracy with more proportional political representation, your best bet is to pack your bags.
However, if you are ever in the extraordinary position of framing a new constitution or amending one, my advice is to learn from our experience and the experience of other democracies around the world: avoid presidentialism like the plague, embrace the parliamentary system, and adopt a proportional electoral system. This advice is doubly important for highly diverse societies, where majoritarianism (particularly of the non-joint-power variety) frequently leads to violence.
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Rewatch Impressions

Rewatched Veep recently for what I think was the third time? Either way, it left me with some thoughts
- Sue was a lot less featured than I thought. Most episodes had her with minor dialogue in a few scenes only, and there were only a handful that had her with a largish part in the plot (the hostage episode, and the garbage one too), whereas most characters had their day in the limelight, at minimum. Of course some characters will always be minor, but she probably has less total screentime than Furlong. Glad she was back for the finale.
- Testimony was interesting because of the outside view of all of this, and shows the public perception of all the characters. Ben in particular presented as especially charismatic, which was quite something.
- I don't know if this was an Easter egg or not, but Montez goofed up the oath - its '...office of president...' but she said '...the office of the president...', which I thought was odd that it wasn't explicitly mentioned, but I'm willing to be it was difficult to put into the 5-minutes of tightly packed plot conclusion
- I found it odd that Tom James asked to be Treasury Secretary when he did, on election night, whereas it would've made sense to ask Selena after she wins (as she'd be at her happiest), as opposed to when the most powerful woman in the world is at her most tense
- I'm also surprised there wasn't a large deal made over the Electoral College itself, given literally one faithless elector could've been bribed to swap votes and decide the presidency, whereas it wasn't mentioned at all at all.
- Selena's actual political acumen is rarely mentioned, and we only get glipses of it (her postal commission reducing waste in the postal service, her 'successful' raid on the wedding that killed the target). As TV Tropes puts it, its more of an informed ability than anything directly displayed, which unfortunately contributes to it seeming like a 'comedy of errors' at times than an incisive look into the political backrooms. Each of her major attempts are defeated - both Clean Jobs and the (Mommy) Meyer Bill effectively leave her with no major legacy in her first four years in the West Wing.
- One of her issues is having no office in the West Wing (something we're told in a flashback around S6 or S7, I believe?), though Seasons 2 and 3 have her team operating out of an (albeit smaller) office in the West Wing from time to time, which is sort of confusing.
- Given the timeline of politics puts Selena as entering politics in the mid-1990s, she was probably elected to Congress first around the Year of the Woman in 1992. This isn't meant to sound crude or dismissive, but her description of her experience of sexism in politics (such as in the S7 debate) would likely be something more associated with a career in politics in the 70s or 80s. Though not to dismiss a lived experience or anything.
- The progression of women in politics is pretty interesting to comprehend - given this version of 2020s America has had two (three?) female presidents and a female vice president, and every election since 2012 has had a woman on the ticket. Even their 2020 election had two women at the top of the ticket. This has progressed to the point that having a two-woman ticket isn't entirely unthinkable, which is a pretty remarkable step up.
- I live in a country that is not the USA, so our scandals are more of the 'politician leaked a document' or 'minister fell asleep in parliament' type, as opposed to the far, far larger threats current America has, so it may have aged better for my own viewing than for other people's viewing.
- Catherine is at her most interesting when its shown that she's far more like her mother than we'd be led to believe; this is at its best in the second last episode when her and Majorie decide to get married in Europe after all, which sort of rerails her character a bit. She's really easy to feel sorry for, and usually hits a lot of those moments where you just want Selena to do the right thing for once (she doesn't).
- It's rather hilarious seeing that Selena's friends are all as stuck-up as she is; insulting her political skills to her face, not inviting her to a wedding, etc. Its not a stretch to imagine all of them were merely friends because the pressures of Law School brought them together, and find it difficult to maintain a friendship outside of that.
- The show, in my opinion, moves into the flow of 'Election TV' far to quickly, and moves away from an interesting premise too early in its run, to something that is often seen in other shows (Scandal, House of Cards, etc). Not that it isn't still top-tier television, but its just a bit off, looking back in retrospect.
- Helsinki and London visits are rather interesting episodes, and show off the common Vice Presidential duty of foreign visits and funerals that the president doesn't want to attend. (Also, though I could be wrong on the specifics, the USA is attempting to negotiate a trade agreement with Finland, where as an EU member state, the USA would only be able to reach an agreement with the EU as a whole, not individual member states. Plot hole?)
- Could the 'squeaks' from her shoes in the inaugural address even be audible to the general public? They were no louder than her voice, so surely would be less detectable from far away from the microphone. Also, would the technician guys not have a lick of sense and at least mute the microphones until she actually got to the podium?
- I feel like using the party colors was a bit of an unnecessary giveaway, I would've liked to see the election map lit up with orange and cyan or something interesting. Also, I do believe they mention the GOP at one point, just as an aside. My own view on the parties, which explains things like Jonah's base and Montez wanting to ban for-profit prisons is that politics are akin to Ireland's, where one party (Selena's) is a liberal party with a large conservative/traditionalist wing, and the other is a party of the neoliberal center. This would also explain the scope of the president to be able to woo members of the opposing political party in the House vote, which otherwise is a bit immersion-breaking.
- I understand this point is a bit of looking back and scoffing, but how and why was the economy so dramatically upset because of uncertainty in the race? Fundamentally both parties are different flavors of the same soup, so I wouldn't expect the markets to be as spooked as they were, especially given that its weathered greater storms (like the present). It's probably nowhere near comparable to their given analogue of the 2008 crash, which was caused by fundamental issues with lending practices, not 'uncertainty'.
- The scene with Congresswoman Nickerson is one of the best takedowns in television, and I'm glad they channeled that energy into the scene in the finale with Tom's Amy.
- I watched the cut scenes of Catherine's Documentary on the YouTube, and I sorta wish they made a long-form version of that episode, as its simply brilliant, and an interesting shift away from their usual format.
- I forgot how funny the 'Hey Grimace' line is from Furlong.
- Freeing Tibet is one of the major actual successes which she engages in (and which almost justifies her typical bad behavior to Catherine). However, Montez getting the Peace Prize is a bit mad given she had no involvement (I understand, its a plot point), but she had no part in signing the actual agreement. After Selena leaves office, there's no benefit to her from keeping it secret anymore, especially when such a major legacy achievement is on the line; given that one (Tibet) significantly outweighs the other (leaking her tweet coverup), there's no real reason why she'd keep it a secret while remaining in-office either, or go to such extremes in her post-presidency either. I understand a throwaway line from Jane McCabe on how it was very big of her to keep quiet at such a critical juncture, I still can't see any reason she kept it hidden so long.
- Another plot question - if Mina was in a sexual relationship with a candidate in the Georgian election, how was she allowed to not only be a supervisor, but a direct overseer from the UN? Do they not have self-declaration forms for this kinda thing?
- I bet Montez wishes she appointed Selena to the Supreme Court after all.
- Shawnee Tanz is a fantastic character, and represents an interesting Ellen Wilson-style figure of when the more powerful half of a political couple isn't the politician, an archetype totally absent from the show before S6.
- Season 7 is noticably rushed, which is a shame, but is understandable given the health problems JLD had. Plot elements are dropped, like Amy's abortion, which could've been rather interesting if properly fleshed out (wonder are there any extended fan-written interpretations out there?). Others, like Richard's political rise, are solid plotlines, but just happen far too rapidly. Otherwise its a pretty interesting season, even if it does tread a lot of the same ground that Seasons 3 and 4 do. Most of Selena's attitudes are very scorched earth, which doubtless made it more of a tense campaign than is depicted; with election rigging to Selena even using a slogan that is a direct attack on a fellow candidate.
- The finale also poses the question of Selena being too proud to ask Kemi to be her running mate (assuming Kemi would go for it; she was pretty close to Selena in delegate totals), and only considering her immediately before Kemi goes nuclear on CNN. This is aided by the fact two-female tickets are a bit more feasible in this America, of course.
- After Selena and Jeff Kane successfully browbeat Jonah into accepting the VP position, it does raise the question as to why they didn't just try browbeat him into accepting AgSec or something minor; he doesn't have Shawnee Tanz to back him up anymore, though I do wish she had stuck around.
- I understand people make criticisms of Veep S7 looking too much like a direct Trump parallel, though I think it's because we've largely forgotten the parallels to the Obama administration that early seasons have - from questioning Chung's citizenship, to the Michelle Obama-Selena link of being a powerful and capable woman stuck with dealing with obesity, not a major issue. My only issue would be Amy physically resembles Kellyanne Conway too much, but though I suspect once the Trump administration fades into obscurity, it'll end up being seeming less of a direct parody.
- I wish someone did a 'fashion analysis' of Veep, as I've seen some good ones of Mean Girls and the like, so that would be entertaining to watch.
- Selena's personality evolves throughout the series, going from 'abrasive and jilted, yet well-meaning public servant' to 'someone desperate for a last grasp at power'. In that, the ending scene of S6 works incredibly well as a 'the gang is back for one last blast' type scene. The ending part of the convention scene works incredibly well to that regard, where she individually sells out each and every ideal and person that's important to her. What really gets me, is that its nothing she hasn't done before either, its just a really condensed and focused impact of what's happened throughout her career; she defamed Tom James with the assault allegation in the same way she fueled the Chung torture rumor; she sells out her daughter in the way that she's, well, done it all of Catherine's life; minor details like drilling rights on federal lands are an easy mirror of past sell-outs like support for a border wall; though of course Gary takes the absolute cake, and its a fantastic finale for that reason.
- I do question how on earth she actually banned same-sex marriage - if both parties are at least moderated somewhat, there's no political use in banning same-sex marriage; even Buddy Calhoun doesn't represent a large enough slice of the pie that she can't avoid appeasing them. I suppose its one way of cementing her repulsion of Catherine, but it seemed sorta superfluous. Also, the fact it may well take a constitutional amendment, too?
- While obviously the general idea of the Oval Office scene was to hammer home how lonely it is at the top, she could well 'resurrect' at least part of her team if she had the willpower - Amy would likely jump at the chance to be free of Jonah, and Dan could well be bought/bribed back with some form of access to power or money. Not to mention how Jonah and Richard are still part of the cabinet, and Sue is unfixingly changed. Sure, she's lonely, but its not an immovable situation.
Anyway, this was far longer than I intended. 9/10
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The Importance of Being Candid: On China’s Relationship with the Rest of the World

https://policyexchange.org.uk/pxevents/on-chinas-relationship-with-the-rest-of-the-world/?fbclid=IwAR2W2jM0CQXW-b5AmRCY9uTq6kPiwLrn7Ygy43Nl7_HnBaRkgUqOsUZEB6k

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SCM8szICMpc&feature=emb_title&ab_channel=PolicyExchangeUK
The Colin Cramphorn Memorial Lecture (I)
The Importance of Being Candid: On China’s Relationship with the Rest of the World
by
Matthew Pottinger
Deputy National Security Advisor to the President of the United States
Matthew Pottinger is Assistant to the President and US Deputy National Security Advisor. Mr. Pottinger served as the Senior Director for Asia since the start of the Trump Administration in January 2017. In that role, Mr. Pottinger advised the President on Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, and Oceania, and coordinated U.S. policy for the region.
Before joining the National Security Council staff, Mr. Pottinger ran Asia research at a New York-based investment firm and, prior to that, was the founder of a consultancy serving American investors in East Asia. Mr. Pottinger served as a U.S. Marine, with active duty in Japan and three combat deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan, followed by reserve duty at the Pentagon and the Defense Intelligence Agency. Prior to military service, Mr. Pottinger lived and worked in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and China from 1997-2005, reporting for Reuters and The Wall Street Journal. He is fluent in Mandarin.
INTRODUCTION
DEAN GODSON: Good afternoon, my name is Dean Godson, I’m Director of Policy Exchange, I have the privilege, pleasure of being your host for this 9th Colin Cramphorn Memorial Lecture. As many of you will know and remember, Colin was the much-loved Chief Constable of West Yorkshire at the time of the 7/7 bombings, the last Deputy Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary and first Acting Chief Constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland. He was taken from us tragically early by cancer, still remembered with much fondness. We’re delighted that his widow, Lynn, is here with us today online and with other members of the family. I know you will all wish to, on behalf of everyone here, to wish them all the very best and to thank them for continuing to be patrons of this lecture which would have, I know, meant so much to Colin.
As I say, this is the 9th such lecture and our guest of honour today, our keynoter, Matt Pottinger is Deputy National Security Advisor to the President of the United States. He was previously a distinguished journalist with the Wall Street Journal and then joined the US Marine Corps and won combat decorations for his service in Iraq and Afghanistan. He’s one of the leading authorities in the US government on China and that is why uniquely today we are innovating today here at Policy Exchange because as a more than fluent Mandarin speaker, Matt’s address today will be delivered in Mandarin for the sake of audiences across the world and indicating his belief that China is not defined solely by the People’s Republic of China and its representatives, that there is a wider engagement to be had with audiences across the world, Mandarin speaking and others, so good evening to anyone coming in from the Indo Pacific region and China in particular, good morning to all of you in Washington.
Matt, as I say, will make his remarks first in Mandarin and we’ll then open the floor to questions for 35 minutes or so of questions. As I say, we are delighted to be doing this here at Policy Exchange with the importance of this subject of the wider Indo Pacific region and China in particular. We have our own Indo Pacific Commission, chaired by former Canadian Prime Minister Steven Harper, which will be publishing in the near future its findings and it work. Also, because of the particular importance of this subject and because of the proximity to the US Presidential election, we are having actually two Cramphorn Memorial Lectures in close succession, one obviously the one today by Matt Pottinger and the other next week by Dr Kurt Campbell of the Asia Group, one of the leading authorities on Asia from the last Democratic administration of Barack Obama, of particular significance because people are increasingly aware in this country that in an era of polarisation in America, the area of the Indo Pacific and China is one subject where discussion and even a measure of consensus is still possible in the United States. So, thank you to Matt Pottinger for honouring us in this way, we look forward to hearing your unique address and insights and then open to wider discussion, thank you Matt.
SPEECH TRANSCRIPTION
I’d like to thank Dean Godson and Policy Exchange for inviting me to deliver the ninth annual Colin Cramphorn lecture. We all look forward to a time when we can gather again in person for events like this. With new vaccines and therapeutics on the near horizon, I’m optimistic that day will soon arrive. In the meantime, let’s pretend we’re at the Red Lion pub and enjoy this convivial, trans-Atlantic video conference between Westminster and the White House. I’m betting on a lively discussion following my set remarks.
As most of you know, England and America are two countries separated by a common language. In order to bridge that divide, I’ve decided to give my remarks in Mandarin.
Truth be told, Dean Godson asked me to bust out my Chinese for the sake of higher ratings. Dean knew that a video of an earlier speech I delivered in Mandarin, about China’s May Fourth movement, was viewed more than one million times. Dean may have also known that a subsequent video I recorded in English for the Ronald Reagan Institute was, by contrast, barely noticed by even my own staff.
Naturally, Dean calculated that a white guy speaking in stilted Mandarin would be a bigger box-office draw than whatever message the white guy might be trying to convey.
So be it. As a character on The Simpsons once put it: “Come for the freak, stay for the food.”
Delivering these remarks in Mandarin has another benefit: It allows friends in China to join a conversation that is taking place with increasing regularity around the globe: A conversation about China’s relationship with the rest of the world.
FOREIGN INTERFERENCE IN HISTORY
But first, a smidgen of history to underscore what’s at stake.
Near the end of the 18th century, across the water and many miles from England, a group of visionary men drew up a constitution. The document they framed was designed to limit the powers of government, assert the rights of the people, and chart a path toward what they hoped would be a lasting democracy.
I’m talking, of course, about… Poland.
“Poland?” you ask. Don’t be embarrassed if 1790s Poland didn’t turn up in your high-school textbooks. Unlike the more famous U.S. Constitution, which was adopted just a few years earlier and still serves as the supreme law of the American republic, the Polish experiment with constitutional government was strangled in its infancy.
The problem was foreign interference. A faction of the Polish nobility felt threatened by the influence they would lose under the new constitution. So they sought Russian help in reestablishing the old order. Catherine the Great seized the opportunity to invade and then partition Poland—she took the east and Prussia took the west.
Then, after defeating a revolt led by Tadeusz Kosciuszko, a Polish military hero of the American Revolution, Russia—along with Prussia and Austria—carried out a final partition of Poland-Lithuania in 1795. The young Commonwealth was erased from the map altogether.
I mention Poland’s failed experiment for two reasons: First, it’s a reminder that democracy, while unrivaled in terms of legitimacy and results, is neither invincible nor inevitable. Second, interference in the affairs of free societies by autocratic regimes is a phenomenon that is waxing, not waning.
To stave off meddling, it never hurts to have favorable geography—a luxury Poland didn’t enjoy. Poland’s 18th Century neighbors were powerful European monarchies. America’s neighbors, by contrast, were the two best friends a fledgling democracy could ever ask for—the Atlantic and the Pacific.
FOREIGN INTERFERENCE IN THE CYBER AGE
But in the cyber age, autocratic governments can concoct disinformation, inject it into the public discourse of nations, and amplify it through self-improving algorithms from the other side of the earth. Are the blessings of oceans and channels sufficient barriers against this sort of meddling?
Not if the citizens of free and sovereign nations yield to complacency. Nations, including democracies, are undergoing the first stage of a real-life “stress test” of their ability to withstand covert, coercive, and corrupt influence by high-tech autocracies.
This may seem odd, because the autocracies are so vastly outnumbered. But they compensate by marshalling the full resources of their states, by learning from one another’s successes and failures, and sometimes by coordinating with one another.
Economic strength isn’t a prerequisite for waging cyber warfare. Thus, we see hackers tasked by Moscow and Tehran attempting to undermine confidence in the upcoming U.S. presidential election. But no regime has more riding on its ability to influence the perceptions, policies and priorities of foreign populations than the Chinese Communist Party.
THE PARTY’S “MAGIC WEAPON”
In truth, we should’ve expected this. The Communist Party’s victory in the Chinese civil war owed less to its combat prowess against superior Nationalist forces than to its ability to infiltrate and manipulate the language, thinking, and actions of its adversaries. This is why the current Party leadership is redoubling its emphasis on “United Front” work.
The defining feature of United Front work is that it’s not transparent. The clue is in the name.
China’s United Front Work system is a gigantic government function with no analogue in democracies. China’s leaders call it a “magic weapon,” and the Party’s 90 million members are required to support its activities. While the system has many branches, the United Front Work Department alone has four times as many cadres as the U.S. State Department has foreign-service officers. But instead of practicing diplomacy with foreign governments—the Chinese foreign ministry handles that—the United Front gathers intelligence about, and works to influence, private citizens overseas. The focus is on foreign elites and the organizations they run. Think of a United Front worker as a cross between an intelligence collector, a propagandist, and a psychologist.
I know that sounds like the opening line to a joke. But United Front work is serious business, and it affects you and me. After all, the raw material for psychologists is data about their patients. The Party is compiling digital dossiers on millions of foreign citizens around the world. The exposure last month of a Chinese database on at least 2.4 million people around the world—including many of us on this call—speaks to the Party’s sheer ambition to wed traditional Leninist techniques with powerful new tools of digital surveillance.
The company building these dossiers, Shenzhen Zhenhua Data Information Technology Co, supports what its CEO reportedly calls “psychological warfare.” Zhenhua harvests and organizes public and private data about us for exploitation by its clients, which are organs of the Chinese security apparatus, according to its website.
The dossiers Zhenhua is compiling include people in virtually every country on earth, no matter how small. They include members of royal families and members of parliament, judges and clerks, tech mavens and budding entrepreneurs, four-star admirals and the crewmembers of warships, professors and think-tankers, and national and local officials. They also include children, who are fair game under Beijing’s rules of political warfare. No one is too prominent or too obscure.
Zhenhua isn’t a particularly large or sophisticated actor in the United Front world. It may even be acting opportunistically, because it thinks the Party will reward it. Far more powerful tech firms, including famous Chinese app developers, play a much bigger role in this kind of work.
Assembling dossiers has always been a feature of Leninist regimes. The material is used now, as before, to influence and intimidate, reward and blackmail, flatter and humiliate, divide and conquer. What’s new is how easy we’ve made it for autocrats to accumulate so much intimate data about ourselves—even people who’ve never set foot in China. We leave our intellectual property, our official documents, and our private lives on the table like open books. The smart phones we use all day to chat, search, buy, view, bank, navigate, network, worship and confide make our thoughts and actions as plain to cyber spooks as the plumes of exhaust from a vintage double-decker bus.
The Chinese Communist Party has reorganized its national strategy around harnessing that digital exhaust to expand the Party’s power and reach.
THE PARTY’S GOALS
But what’s the ultimate point of all the data collection and exploitation? What is Beijing trying to influence us to do? The Party’s goal, in short, is to co-opt or bully people—and even nations—into a particular frame of mind that’s conducive to Beijing’s grand ambitions. It’s a paradoxical mindset—a state of cognitive dissonance that is at once credulous and fearful, complacent and defeatist. It’s a mindset that on Monday says “It’s too early to say whether Beijing poses a threat,” and by Friday says “They’re a threat, all right, but it’s too late to do anything about it now.” To be coaxed into such a mindset is to be seduced into submission—like taking the “blue pill” in The Matrix.
How does Beijing do it? This is where United Front propaganda and psychology come into play. The Party’s overseas propaganda has two consistent themes: “We own the future, so make your adjustments now.” And: “We’re just like you, so try not to worry.” Together, these assertions form the elaborate con at the heart of all Leninist movements.
The Kiwi scholar Anne-Marie Brady, a pioneer in sussing out United Front ploys, points to the Party’s global campaigns—“One Belt, One Road” and the “Community of Common Destiny for Mankind”—as classic specimens of the genre.
Brady calls United Front work a “tool to corrode and corrupt our political system, to weaken and divide us against each other, to erode the critical voice of our media, and turn our elites into clients of the Chinese Communist Party, their mouths stuffed with cash.”
The con doesn’t always work, of course. Facts sometimes get in the way. The profound waste and corruption of many One Belt, One Road projects is an example. When the con doesn’t induce acquiescence, the Party often resorts to intimidation and repression.
Take Hong Kong, where demonstrators took to the streets by the millions last year to protest Beijing’s efforts to undermine Hong Kong’s rule of law. If “socialism with Chinese characteristics” was the future, the demonstrators seemed to prefer staying firmly in the present.
So Beijing resorted to Plan B. It demolished Deng Xiaoping’s “One Country, Two Systems” framework and deprived Hong Kong of the autonomy that made it the most spectacular city in Asia.
HOW WE DEFEND OURSELVES
None of this is reason for panic, mind you. It’s true the West is going through one of its periodic spells of self-doubt, when extreme political creeds surface on the left and the right, and some ideas are so foolish that, to paraphrase George Orwell, only an intellectual could believe them. So let’s pull up our socks and get back to common sense.
On the foreign policy front, President Trump has ingrained two principles worth sharing here, because they’re designed to preserve our sovereignty, promote stability, and reduce miscalculation. They are reciprocity and candor.
Reciprocity is the straightforward idea that when a country injures your interests, you return the favor. It is eminently reasonable and readily understood, including by would-be aggressors. It’s an inherently defensive approach, rooted in notions of fair play and deterrence.
Candor is the idea that democracies are safest when we speak honestly and publicly about and to our friends, our adversaries, and ourselves. This can take some getting used to. When President Reagan was preparing to give a speech in Berlin, several of his staff tried desperately to get him to remove a phrase they found embarrassing and needlessly provocative. Luckily, President Reagan went with his gut, and delivered the most famous line of his presidency: “Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall.”
Some will argue that confrontational rhetoric turns countries into enemies. This old chestnut of the U.S. diplomatic corps masquerades as humble policy, but is in fact quite arrogant because it presumes nations act primarily in reaction to whatever the United States says or does.
Clever adversaries use such thinking against us. By portraying truth-telling as an act of belligerence, autocrats try to badger democracies into silence—and often succeed. “This is the first and most important defeat free nations can ever suffer,” President Reagan said at Guildhall. “When free peoples cease telling the truth about and to their adversaries, they cease telling the truth to themselves.” Public candor actually promotes peace by reducing the space for strategic blunders.
Public candor applies to our internal affairs, too. There can be no double standard.
When Louis Armstrong performed in the Soviet Union as a cultural ambassador of the State Department, he spoke frankly about racial bigotry in the United States. When Reagan famously referred to the Soviet Union as an “Evil Empire,” he explored America’s own “legacy of evil”—including anti-Semitism and slavery—in the very same speech.
XINJIANG
So it is in a spirit of friendship, reflection, and, yes, candor, that I ask friends in China to research the truth about your government’s policies toward the Uyghur people and other religious minorities. Ask yourselves why the editors of The Economist, in a cover article this week, called those policies “a crime against humanity” and “the most extensive violation in the world today of the principle that individuals have a right to liberty and dignity simply because they are people.”
As a Marine who spent three combat deployments fighting terrorists, I can tell you that what is taking place in Xinjiang bears no resemblance whatsoever to an ethical counter-terrorism strategy. Such abuses are what the Chinese diplomat P.C. Chang was trying to prevent when he helped draft the 1948 United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights. There is no credible justification I can find in Chinese philosophy, religion, or moral law for the concentration camps inside your borders.
WHAT EVIL FEARS MOST
Colin Cramphorn, for whom this lecture is named, was Chief Constable of West Yorkshire before his death from cancer in 2006. Colin worked the most notorious terrorism cases in British history, from the Omagh car-bombing to the London suicide attacks of 2005. When your day job is to confront evil, it’s hard to avoid dwelling at night on big questions about the human heart. Colin, a voracious and varied reader, sometimes consulted the writings of C.S. Lewis.
I’m told he found particular solace in The Screwtape Letters—Lewis’s brilliantly imagined monologue of a demon toiling in Satan’s bureaucracy. (John Cleese recorded a pitch-perfect rendition of the book a few decades ago, by the way. It’s on YouTube. I’m told Andy Serkis has recorded a version that gives Cleese a run for his money.)
“The safest road to Hell,” old Screwtape advises his nephew, “is the gradual one—the gentle slope, soft underfoot, without sudden turnings, without milestones, without signposts.”
I suspect Colin drew hope and courage from the knowledge that evil, properly identified and exposed, is frail—even farcical. And that calling it out in public—giving it “signposts”—inoculates us against temptation and liberates us from fear. As my friend Tony Dolan told me: “The great paradox of institutionalized evil is that it can be enormously powerful but also enormously fragile. Thus, it is compulsively aggressive and ultimately self-destructive. It senses its own moral absurdity. It knows it is a raft on a sea of ontological good.”
“What evil fears most is the publicly spoken truth.”
So speak up, everyone. And raise a glass tonight to the good constable Colin Cramphorn and to like-minded public servants the world over. They have our love and our thanks.
QUESTION AND ANSWER
DEAN GODSON: Matt, thank you for a truly brilliant and memorable address. You have now very kindly agreed to answer questions. Just two items of protocol here, please put your virtual hands up and please also look into the camera when you’re speaking because of the exigencies of the virtual event. The final house rule that all of you will be aware of, no question too outrageous, you just have to state your name and organisation before pronouncing. David Brunston, if you can just restate for the record your name and organisation, you wanted to ask a question. David, we can’t hear you. A number of people have been texting in to me, some of them wanted to be asked anonymously, Matt, so if I can use Chairman’s privilege to ask on their behalf. A little more detail, is the strategy, the CCP strategy of wolf diplomacy, is it too far gone now? Could you say more in a bit more detail, they ask, what in your view, the US administration’s perspective, the counter measures should be?
MATT POTTINGER: Dean, thanks so much. You know, I think in a way the wolf warrior diplomacy is an expression of a moment of a kind of desperate opportunism. In a sense, I think as many countries have caught on to the scope of Beijing’s ambitions and have started to push back where they think or the community of nations think they go too far or are damaging to countries sovereignty or interests. I think the process of pushing back has led to a bit of a dropping of the fig leaf, if you will, and this more combative approach to diplomacy, it’s a more coercive approach to diplomacy so I think that what all countries need to do – and this is for the sake of stability by the way, this is in the interest of re-establishing a kind of equilibrium and more constructive, results-oriented relationship between China and the community of nations. I think the two ideas that I talked about in the speech and that are central to President Trump’s approach, the reciprocity but also the candour, will help go quite some way in restoring that balance.
DEAN GODSON: Brilliant, thank you and I’ve been asked to ask the question on behalf of David Brunston of Reuters and the question he wants to ask is how would you expect US policy under a second Trump administration to evolve and how it would differ from a policy that the Biden administration might pursue?
MATT POTTINGER: Yes, so people advising Vice President Biden talk about what he thinks a good policy would be but in terms of President Trump’s approach, I think first you have to take stock of the fact that there is a new consensus and the forging of that new consensus about China is something that has happened under President Trump’s watch, it is in no small part because of the policies that he’s taken and the result has been that it has actually, as you alluded to in the introductory remarks, Dean, it’s a bipartisan, it’s a whole of society consensus and as you read polls popping up all over the world, you see that it’s not just an American consensus anymore either. We’ve led that consensus, that’s been President Trump’s hallmark, probably the most key legacy and shift in American foreign policy in quite some time but there are a lot of other countries that are now starting to, at a minimum, share a very similar consensus on the diagnosis of what the problem is and increasingly, a lot of countries, our European allies, allies across the Indo Pacific region and beyond, who are exploring and in some cases taking similar steps to those that President Trump has advocated for.
DEAN GODSON: Thank you. The next question is from the Right Honourable Lord Mandelson, former Deputy Prime Minister and European Commissioner. Peter, your question if you can come in.
PETER MANDELSON: Dean, thank you very much indeed and I hope you can hear me.
DEAN GODSON: Loud and clear.
RT HON LORD MANDELSON: I have been rather impressed by Matt Pottinger’s lecture and I find myself actually a supporter of both reciprocity and candour and as somebody who, when I was Trade Commissioner, was equally accused of using confrontational rhetoric towards China when I described them as a trade juggernaut out of control, I can see its usefulness. Can I ask though this question to Mr Pottinger? For China in a sense to lose, the West has to win and the West has not been winning during the last four years. With humility and self-criticism, could Mr Pottinger explain to us why he thinks the West has not been strengthened in its coherence and its unity during the last four years and why we have been less able to act in a joined-up way towards China and other international questions than we have during other periods since the Second World War?
DEAN GODSON: Thank you. Matt.
MATT POTTINGER: Thank you, that’s a great question and a great thoughtful prelude to the question as well, thank you. Look, President Trump came in following what I believe and certainly the people who elected him believed was a lengthy period of failure in American foreign policy and really more of a failure of broader foreign policy in the West. We got in lengthy wars under sort of a I think a misimpression that we would be able to inject democracy into far corners of the earth by the barrel of a gun, those have been enormously costly. Those are things that really have done damage, I think, to the West.
China’s entry into the WTO and all of the policies, really the assumptions that led to that and I shared those assumptions 20 years ago so I don’t blame or cast aspersions for what was actually very optimistic bold policy taken by the United States and the West to try to help China become more liberal, first economically and then we hoped politically as well but I think we’ve now taken stock of the fact that some of those assumptions were generous but misplaced. In fact, really the high watermark of China’s opening and liberalisation was December 11th 2001, which I think was the date China entered the WTO. After that, all of those reforms that we so eagerly anticipated by bringing China into the WTO, actually flatlined, things started to plateau for about a decade and over the course of the decade that we’ve just concluded, we saw those reforms go into reverse.
We’ve seen a far greater concentration of power in the hands of the state over the economy, over people’s lives and what we’ve learned is that optimistic period, the reform and opening period if you like, was unfortunately an interregnum, it was an interregnum between the totalitarianism of Mao’s rule and a new technologically enhanced totalitarianism under the current leadership and I’ve heard some refer to it as an attempt at so-called exquisite totalitarianism. I think that that’s a good encapsulation of what has now being attempted, this experiment that Beijing is running to see whether or not it can improve on the failed approach of all the other Leninist states of the 20th century by compensating for the failures of those systems through advanced technology and totalitarian surveillance. So, in short, I think this period that you’re referring to that you characterise as a sort of insufficient pulling together of the West, you’ve got to have a little bit of historical perspective that we’re going through a massive change from the post-Cold War era of the last few decades to a new one that takes stock of some of the failures of the last 30 years. Thanks.
DEAN GODSON: Brilliant, thank you. Next, Deborah Haynes, Foreign Editor, Sky News. Deborah, are you coming in?
DEBORAH HAYNES: Hopefully. Hi, thank you very much, thank you for letting me ask a question and thank you for that fascinating presentation. In terms of how you were describing how the United Front is implementing China’s policies, is what we’re seeing now, given that China is this rising power, a kind of a global battle over ideologies? I mean there’s no rule book that says that China has to adopt the rules based system and carry on using it if it’s the predominant power and if that’s the case, could you just spell out what the danger is if liberal democracies, who are far more fractured now than they have been, if they don’t stand together and stand up for the ideologies of free speech and human rights and all the things that we believe in, that we will see this big global division between those who side with China technologically and ideologically, and those who side with the West, much more than we’ve ever seen before?
MATT POTTINGER: That’s also a great question. So, American foreign policy has had this element, this tradition of realpolitik which, you know, there are nations that calculate on the basis of their own cold self-interest and also running in our veins is this tradition of our own revolutionary liberal democratic world view. They run in our veins like iced water and hot water and hopefully they remain in good enough balance that your blood stays at a good temperature. But you’ve hit on something, the truth is that you cannot ignore the ideological dimensions and ideology is just a fancy word for world view, right. We do have a markedly different world view from the Chinese Communist Party, a different approach to the world, different ideas about quite a lot and that’s not true of China as a whole. The Chinese Communist Party is firmly in command of China, obviously, but China is a lot of things. It is a pretty remarkable civilisation that I have devoted a huge part of my adult life to living in and studying and enjoying and I still do; the history, the culture and the unbelievable drive and energy and entrepreneurialism of the Chinese people. But that ideological dimension is unavoidable and if we try to ignore it, if we try to pretend that it’s only a matter of cold self-interest on both sides, that it’s a Thucydides trap as some like to frame it, I think we’d actually put ourselves on a path towards a more destabilised future than if we were to talk quite frankly to ourselves, our allies and yes, to our adversaries about those differences so that we can avoid miscalculation.
DEAN GODSON: Thank you, Matt. Next question from Alexander Downer, our Chairman of Trustees here at Policy Exchange and, of course, the longest serving Australian Foreign Minister in the country’s history and High Commissioner in London. Alexander.
HON ALEXANDER DOWNER AC: Thanks Dean, I hope you can hear me. I think, speaking as an Australian, it has to be said that we Australians had a fairly solid although not tension-free relationship with China for many years under Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao and Australians have been really taken aback by the aggression in recent years of the Xi Jinping administration so my question is a little bit like Peter Mandelson’s, if there’s a second Trump administration what specific steps will the United States be taking to help countries like Australia which have been targeted by China, particularly Australian trade has been targeted by China, to help build a sense of collective security amongst liberal democracies in the Indo-Pacific region.
MATT POTTINGER: Yes, that’s a great remark that you made and Australia has been in some sense the canary in the coal mine. Australia – by the way, when people claim that provocative and frank, candid language is what causes China to act out in this sort of wolf warrior way, I always point to Australia as well as India as the counter examples there because India and Australia are two countries that had, really went out of their way to extend warmth to China in their people to people and commercial ties. These were countries that did seek to integrate their economies certainly, especially in the case of Australia and yet, when the Australian government just earlier this year had the temerity to ask the World Health Organisation whether there could be a general investigation into the origins of the coronavirus, China retaliated for that wholly reasonable request that Australia made. By the way, the World Health Organisation members voted in the largest majority in the organisation’s history in favour of the motion that Australia raised to investigate the origins, how is it that millions of us now have been infected with this disease? China retaliated by putting tariffs on Australian barley, cancelling beef exports and describing … their arch-propagandist said that Australia is chewing gum stuck to the bottom of China’s shoe and it is time to scrape it off. So, there you have a pretty good counter-argument to the notion that by being extra-friendly to China and hiding some of our candour, that that would lead to a happier bilateral relationship doesn’t stand up.
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Audio-Drama.com links from December 6 to December 12, 2020

Audio-Drama.com is an online directory of audio drama and spoken word websites, with at least one new link added to it each day. As of this post, there are 5,100 published articles. Here are the newest articles from the previous week:
  1. Venom & Vulnerability (Full Cast Urban Fantasy Series) Venom & Vulnerability is a fantasy advicecast where Ella and Eustacia, two new friends and housemates, talk about How To Person in a fictional magical multiverse of quirky, creepy, and cool imaginary beings. The world is fiction, but the advice aims to be genuinely helpful.
  2. The Podskit (Full Cast Comedy Anthology) This ain't your everyday podcast. Hear "unique" podcasts from a cast of characters sure to make you scratch your head. 'Ice Cream, I Scream', a podcast for the lactose intolerant that love ice cream. Find out what Brad Rradley and his basement dwelling, club hopping friends are up to in 'The Brad Rradley Hour'. Denied by that tank themed investment/inventor show? Share your anger with the guys from 'Tanks For Nothing'. And so much more. You never know what you'll get each week.
  3. Classic Horror Stories (Narrated Horror Anthology) Stories that have been around for more than fifty years designed to frighten... even if it's just with the way they used to write.
  4. Middle East Center Stage (Full Cast Multigenre Anthology) GOLDEN THREAD PRODUCTIONS is the first American theatre company devoted to plays from or about the Middle East. For 25 years, Golden Thread has created artistic excellence with plays that defy stereotypes, and engage diverse communities. Initiated as a response to the theatre closures due to the COVID-19 pandemic, Middle East Center Stage is Golden Thread's podcast series of audio plays. We are thrilled by the opportunity to reach audiences across the globe through this medium.
  5. If Anyone Should Find This (Full Cast Horror Series) The world is changing. Will you change with it? "If Anyone Should Find This" is a 9 episode audio drama that follows two security guards as their lives are forever transformed.
  6. The Web of Truth (Full Cast Comedy Series) The year is 2002. Steven Bradbury has just won Australia's first Winter Olympic gold medal, George Bush Junior and John Howard are still international leaders, and five young men head to Victoria's Mt Buller ski resort for a 21st birthday. Part black comedy, part low-stakes thriller, and partly an ode to early 2000's pop culture, The Web of Truth is a three-part audio mini-series streaming now.
  7. The Seventh Valkyrie (Narrated Urban Fantasy Series) Seven years ago, Edara and the Free Lands were torn apart by Apostalys, and the war that followed his arrival. Then one night, a star falls, and ancient gears begin to turn. Cyrus washes ashore in Edara with a voice in his head, a growing magical power, and a demonic force on his trail. Val is torn from his peaceful exile by a new enemy, one who threatens to drag the man once known as "The Iron Wolf", and the rest of Edara, back to the depths of war. And in the heart of Rene's pleasure district, BC receives a signal, as a looming shadow prepares to step into the light. Welcome to the first chapter. Welcome to the Seventh Valkyrie.
  8. Khôra (Full Cast Science Fiction Series) The women from the tale of Jason and the golden fleece face space monsters, reality TV stars, and the sometimes benevolent, mostly dangerous Olympus Corp as they take on the quest to return the Fleece to Colchis. It's got pirates, it's got sentient spaceships, and it's All About The Ladies! It's also very queer.
  9. The Bellow of Brittle Stars (Full Cast Science Fiction Series) A group of students are given the opportunity to study and explore a giant fossil found floating in the asteroid belt. A story about the awkwardness of meeting new people.
  10. Russian Trolls (Full Cast Comedy Series) Russian Trolls is a sitcom podcast about the true story of the Internet Research Agency, the infamous Russian Troll Farm that influenced the 2016 presidential election and may or may not have helped Donald J. Trump become president.
  11. Crown Jewels (Full Cast Comedy Series) Rags to riches, riches to rags. Crown Jewels follows Heer, Nazzy, and Bilal Kazan (formerly of the Mirza family, the third richest family in the world) as they navigate life on a literal dime. Everything gets turned upside-down when Altaf, the third richest man in the world and Heer's father, knocks on their door asking for a new life of his own.
  12. Aster Podcasting Presents (Full Cast Multigenre Anthology) Aster Podcasting Network hosts episodes and projects from new writers, actors, and people within the network–we compile those stories here for you to enjoy.
  13. No Sleep Tonight Horror Radio Show (Full Cast Horror Anthology) In the vein of the classic radio serials of the 50's and 60's. Fully dramatized radio plays that bring to life horrific tales that will keep you up at night.
  14. Shellshocked (Full Cast Science Fiction Comedy Series) There are always things to account for when looking for a new planet to live on, like, is there oxygen, can we find food, will the aliens hunt us for blood-sport? Well, it's good to know these things which is why Andrea Shaw, chronicler and cartographer, and her crew are doing all the hard work for us! Joining her aboard the Celeste is the fearless yet cranky Captain Locklear; renowned astrobiologist, doctor, botanist, and geologist Remy Dubois; stressed out deep space survivalist Jonathan Choi; and an AI named XAN to hold them all together. With everyone onboard and ready to fly, who knows what going to be out there.... Space survival, bloodthirsty lifeforms, alien ruins, and suspiciously long ferrets are just the beginning, and boy do we have a long way to go.
  15. Sweet Dreams (Full Cast Comedy Series) Sylvia is an anxious soul, but a new book helps her fall asleep in her new flat where she lives with boyfriend Ryan. In her dreams, her subconscious takes her on what could be an adventure of self-discovery or a ridiculous series of events. Can she learn anything before she wakes up?
  16. Citizen Paine (Full Cast Historical Fiction Musical Series) Revolutionary, author, pirate, drinker and sometime maker of ladies corsets, Tom Paine was a 37 year old bankrupt when he sailed the ocean and lit the fuse of the American Revolution. From the alehouses of England to the battlefields of America and the blood soaked streets of Paris, Paine tells his own amazing story with the help of an original score and a cast of thousands. "We have it in our power to begin the World over again!"
  17. The Cellar Letters (Narrated Horror Series) Hey guys! Lost my job during the pandemic so decided to move cross country. So bored that I figured I'd document the move. Hope it's not too boring.
  18. The Illusion of Safety (Full Cast Urban Fantasy Series) 100 years out from a magical war, life has moved on. The true story is lost, nobody seeming to know more than fragments of the whole. Three sisters watch, and change, and grow. A young boy sleeps surrounded by flame.
  19. The Scarecast (Narrated Horror Anthology) This podcast features various scary stories, murders, strange mysteries, conspiracy theories, and creepypasta from popular Youtuber MaddMike. These creepy stories are narrations of different peoples postings on reddit and also from different news sources across the internet. From deep web, stalkers, serial killers, and murder. These stories will be sure to keep you awake all night and under the cover.
  20. Tower 4 (Full Cast Mystery Thriller Series) Mike Archer is a newly appointed fire watcher in the Wyoming woods. While he's never done anything like this before, he needed something new after his mom passed. Now he hopes to spend his days in a tower above the trees looking for fires and working on his new book. But things aren't as quiet and peaceful as he hoped. Strange interference blasts over his radio at night and he starts seeing and hearing creepy noises in the woods. But are these odd occurrences actually happening or is he just going stir crazy?
  21. CHOKKA (Full Cast Musical Drama Series) With original beats, flowing melodies and poetry to stretch your mind and heart. CHOKKA follows the journey of 16-year-old Jem who is coming to terms with the world around them. How they fit into a community in which they feel other and what happens when love punches them in the gut. 20 Stories High youth theatre each give their own voice to Jem as well as weaving in their own personal reflections on love, jealousy, depression and friendship.
  22. Appearances (Full Cast Drama Series) There's the family you grew up with: your mom, your dad, your siblings. And then, there's the family you carry around in your head for the rest of your life. This show is about that second family, the one that lives within you. From Mermaid Palace and Radiotopia, Sharon Mashihi brings you Appearances, a one woman audio show that straddles the line between fiction and truth. Appearances brings to life an Iranian American family and community through the real and fantastical mental machinations of Melanie Barzadeh. Melanie is in her mid 30's and desires nothing more than to become a mother. The difficulty of finding the right partner seems to be directly connected to the struggles witnessed in her home throughout her entire childhood. As Sharon Mashihi voice-acts all the characters in one family, the depth of the love, pain, and struggle is felt with a visceral, profound compassion at every turn.
  23. Down Below the Reservoir (Narrated Horror Anthology) Down Below The Reservoir is the first Irish fiction podcast, adapted from the works of acclaimed horror maven Graham Tugwell (Everything Is Always Wrong) and voiced by award-winning writers Dave Rudden, Sarah Maria Griffin and Deirdre Sullivan. Published in twenty countries, through five continents, these stories unearth the very special misery of small-town Ireland, suspended between terror, hilarity and grief.
  24. The Bus (Full Cast Science Fiction Mystery Series) Buckle up. Seriously, buckle up, this is going to be a bumpy ride. Join 5 college students as they embark on a seemingly normal bus trip. Add in a plethora of strange incidents, rocky relationships, no cell service and we're in for a strange ride. But nothing is quite as strange as the disappearance of that bus five days after it departs from the school. With no leads and an investigation that seems to be running dry, one student will do whatever it takes to find out where the bus is and what happened to the people on it. Welcome to The Bus.
  25. Ad Read (Full Cast Comedy Series) A surreal comedy fiction podcast where we tell stories through ads. Disclaimer: Any references to products/companies real or fake reflect our opinion alone and not the opinion of the companies in question.
Feel free to discuss any of these shows or comment about Audio-Drama.com. Note that the website is currently in the process of being redesigned, so some functionality is limited and pages may look different from one another. I always welcome any questions or feedback.
Previous weekly Audio-Drama.com links
submitted by Hitch42 to audiodrama [link] [comments]

Kaiserreich Beta 0.10 - ‘Blood on the Yangtze’ is out!

Kaiserreich Beta 0.10 - ‘Blood on the Yangtze’
We are out of alpha! Welcome to the first beta version of Kaiserreich for Hearts of Iron 4. We are so happy to be here and couldn’t be more proud of all the work that has been done to get here. We never would have got here without one of the most amazing and passionate communities in all of gaming. Thank you. This update is our largest ever, with no less than 17 pages of changes. Highlights include, of course, the long awaited China update, the Italian rework, new naval changes, our largest ever performance improvement, an insane number of bug fixes and huge quality of life changes. More than ever before, we hope you enjoy playing Kaiserreich!
The KR4 team
P.S. We owe a massive thanks to Dayshine, among others, who have been working on CWTools. It has been an invaluable tool for us and we encourage modders from all Paradox games to make use of it.
P.P.S. We are aware of many people still having trouble with the new launcher. We believe we have identified, and fixed, the cause of some of the issues, though not all. If you are still having trouble, we have written up a guide which we hope will be of some use: https://kaiserreich.fandom.com/wiki/Troubleshooting_the_HoI4_Launcher
Changes
Notable Additions
The Italian Update
Naval Rework 3.0
Added Focus Trees to:
Reworked/expanded focus trees of:
Added Events to/for:
Added Decisions to/for:
Added Custom Paths to/for:
Mapping
GFX
Music Mod
Miscellaneous
Western Europe
Eastern Europe
Southern Europe
Northern Europe
North America
South America
Asia
Africa
Other
Incomplete Content
Fixes
Western Europe
Eastern Europe
Southern Europe
Northern Europe
North America
South America
Asia
Africa
Other
We hope you enjoy playing Kaiserreich as much as we did making it!
- The KR4 Team: Alpinia, Anbory, Arvidus, Beelzebub, Blackfalcon501, DSFDarker, Dr. Njitram, Drozdovite, Edouard Saladier, Eragaxshim, Fbruchmueller, Flamefang, Jeankedezeehond, Jonjon428, Jonny BL, KeetnaWilson, Khalil, Kracc, Krčo, Liegnitz, Maltesefalcon, MantisToboggan, Mifil, OperationsManagementDecisions, PPsyrius, Pietrus, Rei VL, Rinbro, Roniius, Roparex, Rylock, Saladenicoise, Sjarlewis, Skip, Telcontar101, The Alpha Dog, Thomahawk2k, Vidyaország, WordZero, Yard1, Zaddy-Chan and Zankoas
submitted by zankoas to Kaiserreich [link] [comments]

The Case for Accepting Defeat on Roe -- Maybe it is time to face the fact that abortion access will be fought for in legislatures, not courts.

The New York Times has a paywall. Here is the article:
In “Unpregnant,” the HBO bildungsroman released this month, the plot revolves around a 17-year-old heroine who travels from Missouri to Albuquerque — a road trip of 1,000 miles — because that’s the nearest place she can get an abortion without parental consent. Watching it made me recall a conversation with a feminist friend, who shocked the hell out of me last year by saying that progressives were too focused on protecting Roe v. Wade.
Why? The argument is that we currently have the worst of both worlds. We’ve basically lost the abortion fight: If Roe is overturned, access to abortion will depend on where you live — but access to abortion already depends on where you live. At the same time, we have people voting for Trump because he’ll appoint justices who will overturn Roe. Maybe it is time to face the fact that abortion access will be fought for in legislatures, not courts.
I was shocked, but I could see the logic. It’s true that abortion access is already abysmal. The stressful road trip in “Unpregnant” is actually in some ways a best-case scenario; many women seeking abortions aren’t suburban teenagers without economic pressures or family responsibilities. Nearly 60 percent have already had one child and nearly half live below the poverty level; some fear they’ll be fired if they take time off, particularly if they need to make two trips, as they must in the 26 states with mandatory waiting periods.
The argument that the left has already lost the abortion fight reflects the fact that there’s no abortion clinic in 90 percent of American counties. This is the result of the highly successful death-by-a-thousand-cuts anti-abortion strategy, which has piled on restriction after restriction to make abortion inaccessible to as many American women as possible.
Chief Justice Roberts’s concurring opinion this summer in June Medical Services v. Russo — the one that mattered — was hailed as a surprise victory for abortion rights, but not by me. Justice Roberts refused to uphold Louisiana restrictions virtually identical to those the court struck down as unconstitutional just four years earlier, but clearly stated that his reluctance was because of his respect for precedent. Anyone with their eyes open could see the justice signaling to abortion opponents to continue the process of eroding Roe v. Wade’s nigh-absolute protection of access to abortion during the first trimester by inventing new types of restrictions, which they have been remarkably creative in doing.
If Judge Amy Coney Barrett becomes the next Supreme Court justice, Justice Roberts’s vote will be irrelevant, anyway. And if things already looked pretty grim, now they look much worse: Up to 21 states have passed laws banning or limiting abortions in ways that are currently unconstitutional. Many will go into effect immediately if Roe is fully overturned.
So what should we do now? Often forgotten is that R.B.G. herself had decided that Roe was a mistake. In 1992, she gave a lecture musing that the country might be better off if the Supreme Court had written a narrower decision and opened up a “dialogue” with state legislatures, which were trending “toward liberalization of abortion statutes” (to quote the Roe court). Roe “halted a political process that was moving in a reform direction and thereby, I believe, prolonged divisiveness and deferred stable settlement of the issue,” Justice Ginsburg argued. In the process, “a well-organized and vocal right-to-life movement rallied and succeeded, for a considerable time, in turning the legislative tide in the opposite direction.”
What Ginsburg called Roe’s “divisiveness” was instrumental in the rise of the American right, which was flailing until Phyllis Schlafly discovered the galvanizing force of opposition to abortion and the Equal Rights Amendment. Schlafly wrote the culture wars playbook that created the odd coupling of the country-club business elite with evangelicals and blue-collar whites. In exchange for business-friendly policies like tax cuts and deregulation, Republicans now allow these groups to control their agenda on religion and abortion. It’s hard to remember now but this was not inevitable: abortion was not always seen as the partisan issue it is today, nor did evangelicals uniformly oppose abortion.
Whether or not R.B.G.’s assessment of Roe was correct, the best tribute we can pay to her is to do what she suggests: open up the kind of dialogue that occurred in Ireland, where young people knocked on grannies’ doors and persuaded them to vote to legalize abortion, which — much to the distress of the Catholic Church — they did. (At the same time, activists galvanized to ensure that, in the absence of a referendum, women throughout the country would have access to and knowledge about medication abortions.)
I don’t want Roe to be overturned, but if that happens, it could bring political opportunity. The emotional heat that surrounds abortion as an issue manages to obscure that the attitudes driving opposition to abortion actually reveal some surprising common ground with progressives on economic issues.
Non-elites often see elites’ obsession with abortion rights as evidence that they are slaves to ambition who don’t see that “family comes first.” But look closer and one can find embedded in this ideology a powerful critique of capitalism: “I think we’ve accepted abortion because we’re a very materialistic society and there is less time for caring,” as one woman told the anthropologist Faye Ginsburg. The feminist historian Linda Gordon agreed: Those against abortion “fear a completely individualized society with all services based on cash nexus relationships, without the influence of nurturing women counteracting the completely egoistic principles of the economy.”
I’m still reluctant to embrace the “overrule and move on” strategy, but moving on may be our only choice. And if abortion stops playing such a role in presidential elections, then Democrats may fare better with the 19 percent of Trump voters who have bipartisan voting habits and warm feelings toward minorities; we know 83 percent of them think the economy is rigged in favor of the rich and 68 percent favor raising taxes on the rich.
Once their presidential vote is not driven by Supreme Court appointments, how many might decide to vote on economic issues? And what greater tribute could there be to R.B.G. than both a legislative restoration of abortion rights, and a new Democratic Party that can win — not just by a hair but by a landslide?
submitted by pauz43 to prochoice [link] [comments]

A list of every person Christianity has killed in history

I am very outraged about a debate with some person in reddit, he say that islam much worse than christianity historically and that catholicism not teaches that non catholics are condemn to hell for their beliefs!
Now. i am ask them to disprove me by sending them a HUGE LIST from quora of ALL PEOPLES KILLED BY CHRISTIANIY IN HISTORY.
i will ask you two things:
1 - How accurate is this list?
2 - Is Islam worse than it.
Okay here we go:
///
How many people has Christianity killed?
Nathan HimmerichAnswered November 1, 2017·Author has427answersand629.1Kanswer views
Somewhere around 50–100 million. This information is from an external source BUT has neat and organized citations all from Christian sources, and it is in chronological order more or less as well.
Listed are only events that solely occurred on command of church authorities or were committed in the name of Christianity. (List incomplete)
Ancient Pagans
Mission
Crusades (1095-1291)
Heretics
Witches
Religious Wars
Jews
(I feel sick ...) this goes on and on, century after century, right into the kilns of Auschwitz.
Native Peoples
I certify to you that, with the help of God, we shall powerfully enter in your country and shall make war against you ... and shall subject you to the yoke and obedience of the Church ... and shall do you all mischief that we can, as to vassals who do not obey and refuse to receive their lord and resist and contradict him." [SH66]
Of course no different were the founders of what today is the US of Amerikkka.
More Glorious events in US history
20th Century Church Atrocities
Supposedly to fight communism, thousands of buddhist protesters and monks were imprisoned in "detention camps." Out of protest dozens of buddhist teachers - male and female - and monks poured gasoline over themselves and burned themselves. (Note that Buddhists burned themselves: in comparison Christians tend to burn others). Meanwhile some of the prison camps, which in the meantime were filled with Protestant and even Catholic protesters as well, had turned into no-nonsense death camps. It is estimated that during this period of terror (1955-1960) at least 24,000 were wounded - mostly in street riots - 80,000 people were executed, 275,000 had been detained or tortured, and about 500,000 were sent to concentration or detention camps. [MW76-89]. To support this kind of government in the next decade thousands of American GI's lost their life....
For quite some time I heard only rumours about Catholic clergy actively involved in the 1994 Rwanda massacres. Odd denials of involvement were printed in Catholic church journals, before even anybody had openly accused members of the church. Then, 10/10/96, in the newscast of S2 Aktuell, Germany - a station not at all critical to Christianity - the following was stated: "Anglican as well as Catholic priests and nuns are suspect of having actively participated in murders. Especially the conduct of a certain Catholic priest has been occupying the public mind in Rwanda's capital Kigali for months. He was minister of the church of the Holy Family and allegedly murdered Tutsis in the most brutal manner. He is reported to have accompanied marauding Hutu militia with a gun in his cowl. In fact there has been a bloody slaughter of Tutsis seeking shelter in his parish. Even two years after the massacres many Catholics refuse to set foot on the threshold of their church, because to them the participation of a certain part of the clergy in the slaughter is well established. There is almost no church in Rwanda that has not seen refugees - women, children, old - being brutally butchered facing the crucifix. According to eyewitnesses clergymen gave away hiding Tutsis and turned them over to the machetes of the Hutu militia. In connection with these events again and again two Benedictine nuns are mentioned, both of whom have fled into a Belgian monastery in the meantime to avoid prosecution. According to survivors one of them called the Hutu killers and led them to several thousand people who had sought shelter in her monastery. By force the doomed were driven out of the churchyard and were murdered in the presence of the nun right in front of the gate. The other one is also reported to have directly cooperated with the murderers of the Hutu militia. In her case again witnesses report that she watched the slaughtering of people in cold blood and without showing response. She is even accused of having procured some petrol used by the killers to set on fire and burn their victims alive..." [S2]
As can be seen from these events, to Christianity the Dark Ages never come to an end....
References:
[DA]
K.Deschner, Abermals krhte der Hahn, Stuttgart 1962.
[DO]
K.Deschner, Opus Diaboli, Reinbek 1987.
[EC]
P.W.Edbury, Crusade and Settlement, Cardiff Univ. Press 1985.
[EJ]
S.Eidelberg, The Jews and the Crusaders, Madison 1977.
[LI]
H.C.Lea, The Inquisition of the Middle Ages, New York 1961.
[MM]
M.Margolis, A.Marx, A History of the Jewish People.
[MV]
A.Manhattan, The Vatican’s Holocaust, Springfield 1986. See also V.Dedijer, The Yugoslav Auschwitz and the Vatican, Buffalo NY, 1992.
[NC]
J.T.Noonan, Contraception: A History of its Treatment by the Catholic Theologians and Canonists, Cambridge/Mass., 1992.
[S2]
Newscast of S2 Aktuell, Germany, 10/10/96, 12:00.
[SH]
D.Stannard, American Holocaust, Oxford University Press 1992.
[SP]
German news magazine Der Spiegel, no.49, 12/2/1996.
[TA] A True Account of the Most Considerable Occurrences that have Hapned in the Warre Between the English and the Indians in New England, London 1676.
[TG]
F.Turner, Beyond Geography, New York 1980.
[WW]
H.Wollschlger: Die bewaffneten Wallfahrten gen Jerusalem, Zrich 1973. (This is in german and what is worse, it is out of print. But it is the best I ever read about crusades and includes a full list of original medieval Christian chroniclers' writings).
[WV]
Estimates on the number of executed witches:
///
I am angry because they downplaying facts. I am angry because they saying christianity is watered down peaceful religion that is nothing compare to islam. this is so annoying!
submitted by pianovirgin69 to exchristian [link] [comments]

presidential election odds ireland video

Although Michael Daniel Higgins is currently leading Ireland, several predictions for his successor are available. Mairead McGuinness and Fergus Finlay are bookies favorites to become the next president of Ireland. Die Post Irish Presidential Election Betting Odds erschien zuerst am . Irish Presidential Election - Winner Betting Odds. Get the best available Irish Politics odds from all online bookmakers with Oddschecker, the home of betting value. Betting on US Presidential Election online with Betsson is easy & safe. Bet now & enjoy the best politics and business odds & live match bets. Michael D. Higgins. However, despite the opposition, the Irish Presidential Election betting odds have Higgins as the huge favourite to win the vote and remain President of Ireland. Ladbrokes offer odds of just 1/50 for Higgins to have another term in office, despite the opposition he is facing. The latest 2024 presidential election odds show Vice President Kamala Harris as the front-runner over President Joe Biden and former President Donald Trump at most European sportsbooks.For instance, Harris is +350 to win in 2024 at Bet365, with Biden at +400 and Trump at +600. The thinking is that Biden may opt to let Harris take the reigns in the next Presidential election cycle, due to the ... Sportsbooks have put out political betting odds and props for Joe Biden's Presidential Inauguration Day on January 20, 2021. President Election betting odds show that Donald Trump has narrowed the gap with Democratic Presidential Nominee Joe Biden following a strong positive showing at the Republican National Convention. Live betting odds on the 2020 presidential election. Who will win? Trump or Biden?... Who will win the 2020 presidential election? Trump or Biden?... Click to find out . Odds update every minute Last updated: 10:31PM EST on Feb 09, 2021. Election Betting Odds. By Maxim Lott and John Stossel. Why This Beats Polls Odds from FTX.com, Betfair, Smarkets, and PredictIt How People Bet. Home ... On the day that he takes office to become America's 46th president Joe Biden is 5/1 to be re-elected at the next presidential election in 2024.. Those odds are in part due to Biden's age - at 78 ... Politics Irish United Ireland before Jan 1st 2024 View all odds View all odds. Vote on Irish Unification to pass before Jan 1st 2024 9/1; United Ireland before Jan 1st 2030 - Specials View all odds View all odds. Vote on Irish Unification to pass before Jan 1st 2030 5/1; Irish General Election Most Seats View all odds View all odds. Sinn Fein 1/1; Fine Gael 13/8; Fianna Fail 7/1; Green 200/1 ...

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